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ABSTRACT
Test procedures are developed for characterizing the re-
sponse of civil GPS receivers to spoofing attacks. Two re-
sponse characteristics are analyzed in detail for four repre-
sentative GPS receivers: (1) the spoofer power advantage
over the authentic signals required for successful receiver
capture, and (2) the aggressiveness with which a spoofer
can manipulate the victim receiver’s time and position so-
lution. Two of the tested receivers are commonly used
in critical infrastructure applications, one in smart power
grid regulation and one in telecommunications networks.
The implications of the test results for these critical infras-
tructure applications are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001, the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT)
evaluated the transportation infrastructure’s vulnerabil-
ity to GPS and raised concern over the threat of GPS
spoofers [1]. Spoofers generate counterfeit GPS signals
that commandeer a victim receiver’s tracking loops and
induce spoofer-controlled time or position offsets. The
USDOT report noted the absence of any off-the-shelf de-
fense against civilian spoofing and recommended a study
to characterize spoofing effects and observables. In 2008,
researchers demonstrated that an inexpensive portable
software-defined GPS spoofer could be built from off-the-
shelf components, again highlighting the threat of spoofing
[2].
Cell phone networks are one segment of critical infrastruc-
ture that is vulnerable to civil spoofing attacks. CDMA
cell phone towers rely on GPS timing for tower-to-tower
synchronization. Synchronization prevents the towers
from interfering with one another and enables call hand-off
from one tower to the next. If a particular tower deviates
more than 10µs from GPS time, hand-off to and from that
tower is disrupted and overall network throughput is re-
duced [3].
The power grid also possesses a unique vulnerability to
spoofing attacks. More efficient distribution of power
across the grid will require real-time measurements of the
voltage and current phasors [4]. Synchrophasor Measure-
ment Units (SMUs) have been proposed as a smart grid
technology for precisely this purpose. SMUs rely on GPS
to time stamp their measurements, which are sent back
to a central monitoring station for processing. Manipula-
tion of a SMU’s time stamp results in spurious variations
in the measured phase angles. These variations could dis-
tort power flow or stability estimates in such a way that
grid operators would take incorrect or unnecessary control
actions including powering up or shutting down genera-
tors. This could cause blackouts or damage to power grid
equipment. Reference [5] also discusses the effects that
alteration of SMU time stamps might have on fault loca-
tion. This could hamper the ability of utility companies
to respond quickly and appropriately to faults.
While much promising research is currently being con-
ducted on methods for detecting and mitigating spoofing,
these methods are still years away from wide-scale imple-
mentation. Meanwhile, it is important to understand what
risks a spoofing attack poses for existing GPS receivers and
for critical infrastructure reliant on civil GPS for position-
ing, timing, or both. The specific questions that this paper
seeks to answer through experimentation are:
1. Would a jamming-power-to-noise-power (J/N)-type de-
tector, which is commonly used in military GPS receivers
to detect jamming attacks, trigger on a spoofing attack?
2. How aggressively can a civil GPS receiver’s navigation
and timing solution be manipulated by a spoofing attack?
The four receivers tested are meant to be a representative
cross-section of civil user equipment. The receivers are (1)
a science-grade receiver, (2) a time reference receiver with
a highly stable internal clock used in telecommunications
Fig. 1. The Civil GPS Spoofer.
networks, (3) a time reference receiver with a less stable
internal clock used on the power grid, and (4) a consumer-
grade handheld receiver.
II. THE SPOOFER
The Civil GPS Spoofer used for these tests, shown in
Fig. 1, is an advanced version of the spoofer reported in [2].
It is the only spoofer reported in open literature to date
that is capable of precisely aligning the spreading code
and data bits and matching the frequency of its counter-
feit signals with the authentic GPS signals. Such align-
ment capability allows the spoofer to carry out a sophisti-
cated spoofing attack in which no obvious clues remain to
suggest that an attack is underway. This spoofer is imple-
mented on a portable software-defined radio platform with
a digital signal processor (DSP) at its core. This platform
comprises:
• A Radio Frequency (RF) front-end that down-mixes and
digitizes GPS L1 and L2 frequencies
• A DSP board that performs acquisition and tracking
of GPS L1 C/A and L2C signals, calculates a navigation
solution, predicts the L1 C/A databits, and produces a
consistent set of up to 10 spoofed GPS L1 C/A signals
with a fictitious implied navigation and timing solution.
• An RF back-end with a digital attenuator that converts
the digital samples of the spoofed signals from the DSP
to analog output at the GPS L1 frequency with a user-
controlled broadcast power.
• A Single Board Computer (SBC) that handles commu-
nication between the spoofer and a remote computer over
the Internet.
The spoofer works by first acquiring and tracking GPS L1
C/A and L2C signals to obtain a navigation solution. Once
a navigation solution has been obtained, the spoofer enters
its “feedback” mode. In this mode, the spoofer produces a
counterfeit, data-free feedback GPS signal that is summed
with its own antenna input. The feedback signal is tracked
Fig. 2. A proximity spoofing attack [2].
by the spoofer and used to calibrate the delay between
production of the digitized spoofed signal and output of the
analog spoofed signal. This is necessary because the delay
is non-deterministic on start-up of the receiver, although
it stays constant thereafter.
After feedback calibration is complete and enough time has
elapsed to build up a databit library, the spoofer is ready
to begin an attack. It produces signals that are initially
nearly perfectly aligned with the authentic signals at a low
power to remain below the noise floor. The spoofer then
raises the power of the spoofed signals slightly above that
of the authentic signals. At this point, the spoofer has
taken control of the victim receiver’s tracking loops and
slowly leads the spoofed signals away from the authentic
signals, carrying the receiver’s tracking loops with it. Once
the spoofed signals have moved more than 600 m in posi-
tion or 2 µs in time away from the authentic signals, the
receiver has been completely captured.
For the experiments reported in this paper, the spoofed sig-
nals were not broadcast over the air, but were routed via
coaxial cable to the antenna input of the target receiver,
where they were summed with the authentic signals. This
configuration is representative of a proximity spoofing at-
tack, where the spoofer is within a meter or so of the target
receiver, as shown in Fig. 2. In this case, the spoofer does
not need to account for the distance between its antenna
and the target receiver’s antenna. This type of attack was
originally envisioned in [6].
III. APPROACH
The following two subsections reduce the two questions
posed in the Introduction to specific component questions
that can be addressed by experimentation.
A. Jamming Detector
A J/N-type jamming detector works by comparing the to-
tal received in-band power with the in-band noise power, or
the in-band power as measured by a GPS receiver and an-
tenna combination in the absence of external signals (e.g.
within an anechoic chamber). Account is taken of natural
variations in in-band power due to satellite geometry and
solar activity. To avoid frequent false alarms, a J/N-type
jamming detector triggers only if the measured J/N ratio
exceeds a threshold above which natural variations only
rarely push the J/N measurement. In [7] it is estimated
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that such a trigger would be insensitive to civil GPS spoof-
ing attacks up to a spoofing power ratio of 3, where the
spoofing power ratio is defined as
η =
Pspoof
Pauth
(1)
with Pspoof being the power of the spoofing signal ensem-
ble and Pauth being the power of the authentic signal en-
semble. If all authentic signals are spoofed, then η is also
the ratio of each individual spoofing signal to its authen-
tic counterpart. The question that needs to be answered
through testing is this: What power ratio is required for
reliable spoofing?
B. Aggressive Receiver Manipulation
It is important to understand the types of dynamics that
a spoofer could induce in a target receiver. For exam-
ple, SMU measurements of power grid stability could be
manipulated by spoofer-induced oscillations in the SMU’s
time reference if the SMU were susceptible to extremely
aggressive GPS spoofing.
Three specific questions regarding spoofer induced dynam-
ics are posed:
1. How quickly could a timing or position bias be intro-
duced?
2. What kinds of oscillations could a spoofer cause in a
receiver’s position and timing?
3. How different are receiver responses to spoofing?
The approach taken to answer these questions was to de-
termine the maximum velocities that can be induced in a
target receiver’s position or time solution over a range of
accelerations when starting from a velocity of zero. The
curve in the velocity-acceleration plane created by con-
necting these points defines the upper bound of a region
in which the spoofer can safely manipulate the target re-
ceiver without raising any alarms or causing the target re-
ceiver to lose satellite lock. Figure 3 shows four conceivable
shapes for this curve (a vertical line, a horizontal line, a
line with a negative slope, and an exponential curve) with
the green area representing the safe region for a spoofer
to operate and the red area representing the region where
a spoofer will likely be caught. Once these curves have
been obtained, they can be used to determine the kinds
of dynamics a spoofer could induce on that receiver and
can be compared to curves of other receivers to find which
receivers are most resistant to a spoofing attack.
IV. PROCEDURE
Four receivers were tested in laboratory experiments:
Science receiver: The CASES receiver developed by the
UT Radionavigation Lab in collaboration with Cornell
University and ASTRA. This receiver was designed for
ionospheric monitoring [8].
Telecommunications network time reference receiver: The
HP 58503B, which has been commonly used in cell phone
base stations. The 58503B has a highly stable oven con-
trolled crystal oscillator (OCXO) steered by the GPS time
solution [9].
Power grid time reference receiver: The SEL-2401, which
provides the time signal for most power grid Synchropha-
sor Measurement Units (SMUs). SMUs are a proposed
smart grid technology to make real time measurements of
the voltage phasor (a 60 Hz phasor) for stability analysis,
power flow estimation, and fault location on the power grid
for monitoring and control purposes. It has a low stability
oscillator (most likely a temperature controlled crystal os-
cillator (TCXO) or simple crystal oscillator (XO)) slaved
to the GPS time solution [10].
Name brand receiver: The Trimble Juno SB, a high qual-
ity handheld receiver [11].
Pictures of all of these receivers are shown in Fig. 4. These
receivers are meant to be a representative cross-section of
civil GPS receivers.
Tests were performed in a controlled signal environment
with a set of six GPS L1 C/A signals generated by a
National Instruments Radio Frequency Signal Generator
(RFSG) at a constant power level. Limiting the signals
to a set of six GPS L1 C/A signals at constant power
simplified the tests without significantly affecting the gen-
erality of the results. The signals were tracked by the
spoofer, which produced a set of six corresponding spoofed
signals. The spoofed signals were then summed with the
RFSG-generated signals. This combination of spoofed and
RFSG-generated signals was fed into both the target re-
ceiver and a National Instruments Radio Frequency Signal
Analyzer (RFSA). The RFSA was used for visualization of
the spoofing attack and measurement of the signal power.
Figure 5 shows the described test setup.
A. Power Ratio Test
The power ratio test was performed by first setting the
digital attenuator on the spoofer’s RF back-end so that the
spoofed signals were slightly stronger than the authentic
signals with the signals still aligned. The spoofer then
attempted to capture the target receiver by advancing the
spoofed signals time solution forward at a rate of 3.33 ns/s,
or about 1 m/s in equivalent velocity units.
Once every spoofed signal’s correlation peak had com-
pletely separated from its counterpart authentic signal’s
correlation peak (a separation greater than 2 µs), the au-
thentic signals were removed. The target receiver’s output
was then observed to see if any signals were lost. If no
signals were lost, then the spoofing attack was deemed
successful in capturing the receiver. The authentic signals
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Fig. 3. Plots of four potential shapes of maximum acceleration-velocity curves for receiver position or time dynamics that can be induced by
a spoofer. The green area represents the region where a spoofer can safely operate, and the red area represents the region where a spoofer will
likely be caught. Time rate and acceleration are expressed in equivalent m/s and m/s2.
Fig. 4. The tested receivers: (a) CASES receiver, (b) HP 58503B,
(c) SEL-2401, and (d) Trimble Juno SB.
were then reinserted and the relative power of each authen-
tic and counterfeit signal was measured using the RFSA.
After recording the results, this process was repeated a
number of times. The spoofer’s attenuator setting was
modified as needed to find a power ratio limit above which
a spoofer could consistently capture the target receiver.
Figure 6 summarizes this procedure in a graphical format.
B. Spoofed Acceleration and Velocity Test
The spoofed acceleration and velocity test was performed
with only the spoofing signals as input to the target re-
ceiver to simulate the behavior of the receiver after it has
been captured. This approach eliminated interference with
the authentic signals during these tests. First, an acceler-
ation was set for the spoofer. Next, a final velocity was
Fig. 5. The experimental setup.
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Fig. 6. Graphical representation of the procedure for the power ratio test.
Fig. 7. Graphical representation of the procedure for the spoofed velocity and acceleration test.
chosen for the spoofer to reach. The output from the tar-
get receiver was monitored for alarms or loss of lock on any
satellites until the receiver stabilized at the final velocity.
If any evidence of the spoofing attack was evident in the
receiver alarms or tracking status, then the spoofing at-
tack was deemed unsuccessful. This process was repeated
while modifying the final spoofed velocity until a maxi-
mum spoofed velocity was determined for that accelera-
tion. Once this maximum velocity was found, the spoofed
acceleration was modified and the process repeated until 5
or 6 data points were collected. Figure 7 summarizes this
procedure in a graphical format.
V. RESULTS
A. Spoofing Power Ratio Test
The power ratio test results are summarized by the his-
togram shown in Fig. 8. This histogram shows the num-
ber of successful and failed spoofing attacks for the range
of power ratios tested. This test was performed on both
the science receiver and the telecommunications time ref-
erence receiver. Since both receivers displayed similar re-
sults, it was deemed unneccesary to conduct this test with
the other two receivers.
As can be seen from Fig. 8, it is possible to reliably spoof
a target receiver at a power ratio of 1.1. This value of
η would keep the received in-band power well below the
natural variations due to constellation changes and solar
activity. This means that a J/N-type jamming detector
would not necessarily detect a spoofing attack.
However, a J/N-type jamming detector is still an impor-
tant component in spoofing detection schemes. One such
scheme, the Vestigial Signal Defense (VSD) [2] [12], in-
volves detecting the vestige of the authentic signal and
distinguishing it from a multipath signal, which can only
be done if the authentic signal has not been drowned out
Fig. 8. Histogram of the spoofing power ratio test results performed
on the science receiver and the telecommunications time reference
receiver.
or nulled by the spoofer. Nulling the authentic signal is
inherently difficult since it requires precise anti-alignment
of the phase of a spoofed replica signal with the authentic
signal. This makes drowning out the authentic signal the
more likely attack scenario. A J/N type jamming detector
would constrain the spoofer to operate with a power ra-
tio below about 3, effectively eliminating the possibility of
the spoofer entirely suppressing the authentic signal with
excessive spoofing power.
B. Spoofed Velocity and Acceleration Test
The velocity and acceleration data points collected for each
of the four tested receivers were fit to a single curve for each
receiver of the form:
|amax| = f(vf ) = β1e−β2|vf | + β3 (2)
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TABLE I
Raw data for the science receiver
acceleration velocity
m/s2 m/s
8.8 2.2
7 4.6
6 6.4
5.5 8
5 1300
Fig. 9. Spoofed velocity and acceleration curve fit for the science
receiver.
where vf is the final velocity of the spoofer, amax is the
maximum acceleration the spoofer can use to reach the fi-
nal velocity without triggering alarms or causing dropped
signals, and β1, β2, and β3 are fit parameters. An expo-
nential model was chosen for this data based on intuition
and on the testing results themselves. This model is meant
to represent the capability of the receiver’s discrete time
tracking loops to remain locked to the GPS signal under
the spoofer imposed dynamics. It defines the upper bound
of a region of the velocity-acceleration plane in which the
spoofer can safely operate. Knowledge of this curve for a
particular receiver allows one to assess the security impli-
cations of a spoofing attack on a system dependent on the
receiver.
B.1 Science Receiver (CASES)
The raw velocity and acceleration data points for the sci-
ence receiver are given in Table I. These data were fit to
Eq.(2) and plotted along with the curve fit in Fig. 9. The
resulting values for the fit parameters are listed in Table II.
The first interesting feature to note in Fig. 9 is that there
is a horizontal asymptote at an acceleration of about 5
m/s2. This suggests that the science receiver can be ac-
celerated continuously at accelerations below 5 m/s2. The
only limit to the velocity that can be induced in the sci-
TABLE II
Fit parameters for the science receiver
β1 β2 β3
7.55 0.3 4.94
TABLE III
Raw data for the telecommunications network time
reference receiver
acceleration velocity
m/s2 m/s
5.8 1.45
5 1.7
4.5 1.8
4 1.9
2 2
1 2
ence receiver is due to the Doppler frequency range of the
receiver. Outside this range, the receiver is unable to pro-
duce local carrier replicas at the appropriate frequency re-
sulting in a loss of satellite lock. This Doppler range is set
to ± 10,000 Hz for stationary applications. The maximum
attainable velocity offset is thus dependent on the exact
satellite geometry, but is generally around 1,300 m/s. Be-
yond this speed, the receiver fails to track some satellites
due to the large Doppler.
Another interesting feature of this receiver’s response to in-
duced dynamics is that above accelerations of about 2 m/s2
the receiver indicates a constant state of phase trauma.
The receiver’s phase trauma flag indicates that its Phase
Lock Loop (PLL) may be experiencing cycle slips. This
is a special feature of the science receiver used to measure
the effects of ionospheric scintillation [13]. Indications of
phase trauma in the absence of scintillation could be con-
sidered an alarm. This effectively limits a spoofer that is
trying to influence the navigation solution of the science
receiver to accelerations below 2 m/s2.
B.2 Telecommunications Network Time Reference Re-
ceiver (HP)
The raw velocity and acceleration data points for the
telecommunications network time reference receiver are
given in Table III. These data were fit to Eq.(2) and plot-
ted along with the curve fit in Fig. 10. The resulting values
for the fit parameters are listed in Table IV.
As can be seen from a comparison of Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, the
HP receiver is much more resistant to dynamics than the
science receiver. The maximum velocity that could be suc-
cessfully induced in the telecommunications network time
reference receiver was 2 m/s. This resistance to spoofer
induced dynamics is due to the trust that the HP receiver
places in its highly stable oscillator. The receiver was de-
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Fig. 10. Spoofed velocity and acceleration curve fit for the telecom-
munications network time reference receiver.
TABLE IV
Fit parameters for the telecommunications network time
reference receiver
β1 β2 β3
38.02 1.33e-1 -25.53
signed such that its oscillator’s time output is only loosely
coupled to the GPS time solution. The oscillator is slowly
steered into alignment with the GPS time solution. The
receiver enters a “holdover” mode if the difference between
the GPS time solution and the receiver’s oscillator time is
greater than 1 µs. This feature acts as an alarm to indicate
that GPS should no longer be trusted. It is this feature
that causes the deviation from the curve fit in Fig. 10.
There is simply no spoofer acceleration that will allow the
HP receiver to stabilize at a speed greater than 2 m/s be-
fore entering holdover mode.
B.3 Power Grid Time Reference Receiver (SEL-2401)
The raw velocity and acceleration data points for the power
grid time reference receiver are given in Table V. These
data were fit to Eq.(2) and plotted along with the curve
fit in Fig. 11. The resulting values for the fit parameters
are listed in Table VI.
As can be seen in Fig. 11, the power grid time reference
receiver can be manipulated fairly easily by a spoofer. A
secondary x-axis was added to the figure to represent the
corresponding phase angle rate that could be induced in
a 60-Hz phasor being measured using the receiver’s time
output. These results showed that the power grid time
reference receiver can reach a maximum speed of 400 m/s,
which corresponds to a 1.73 o/min phase angle rate for a
voltage phasor on the power grid. At speeds above 400
m/s, the receiver sporadically looses and regains lock on
the satellites, which could be considered an alarm.
TABLE V
Raw data for the power grid time reference receiver
acceleration velocity
m/s2 m/s
10 2.5
8 75
7 120
5 190
3 360
2 400
1 400
Fig. 11. Spoofed velocity and acceleration curve fit for the power
grid time reference receiver with secondary x-axis corresponding to
the induced phase angle rate for a 60 Hz phasor (such as the voltage
phasor for the power grid).
B.4 Name Brand Receiver (Trimble)
The raw velocity and acceleration data points for the name
brand receiver are given in Table VII. These data were fit
to Eq.(2) and plotted along with the curve fit in Fig. 12.
The resulting values for the fit parameters are listed in
Table VIII.
From comparisons of Fig. 12 with Figs. 9, 10, and 11, the
Trimble is by far the most easily manipulated receiver of
those tested. There is a horizontal asymptote at around 25
m/s2, which suggests that the Trimble can be accelerated
continuously at accelerations below 25 m/s2. As with the
science receiver, the only limit to the velocity that can be
induced is due to the Doppler frequency range of the re-
ceiver. This Doppler range appears to be about ± 10,000
Hz based on the result that the receiver fails to track some
satellites at velocities greater than 1,300 m/s, which was
also the case for the science receiver. These results sug-
gest that the Trimble’s robustness – its ability to provide
navigation and timing solutions despite extreme signal dy-
namics – is actually a liability in regard to spoofing. In
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TABLE VI
Fit parameters for the power grid time reference receiver
β1 β2 β3
10.48 3.3e-3 -0.31
TABLE VII
Raw data for the name brand receiver
acceleration velocity
m/s2 m/s
49.2 12.3
35 15.7
30 19.5
27 23
25 190
24.5 1300
other words, the Trimble receiver’s ability to track high ac-
celerations and velocities allows a spoofer to aggressively
manipulate its outputs.
VI. Implications
A. Implications for Cellular CDMA Communica-
tions Networks
Although the HP receiver provides a high resistance to im-
posed dynamics, it can still be led off far enough in time
to cause some harmful effects on CDMA cell phone net-
works that typically use such receivers. A 10 µs time offset
can be imparted in around 35 minutes, including time for
receiver capture. At this time offset the dependent cell
phone tower becomes an “island tower,” unable to trans-
fer calls to and from adjacent towers [3]. At larger time
offsets, approaching 60 µs, the tower’s signal could begin
to interfere with signals from neighboring towers, caus-
ing a further disruption in the network. This is because
CDMA cell phone towers all use the same spreading code
and distinguish themselves only by start time of the code.
Spoofer-induced time offsets might also be a problem for
other uses of the cell phone network, such as E911-style lo-
calization [14]. E911 or Enhanced 911 is a system that uses
Time Difference Of Arrival (TDOA) techniques to locate
cell phone users who dial 911 in emergency situations.
B. Implications for Power Grid Monitoring and
Control
B.1 State Estimation
One of the most important uses of SMUs for the smart
grid is real-time state estimation. It has been suggested
that SMUs are necessary to provide accurate, real-time
Fig. 12. Spoofed velocity and acceleration curve fit for the name
brand receiver.
TABLE VIII
Fit parameters for the name brand receiver
β1 β2 β3
444.16 0.24 24.92
estimates of the state of the power grid so that power
margins can be reduced to make the grid more efficient
[4]. Spoofing poses a risk to state estimation because a
change in the voltage phase angle difference between two
locations in the grid directly relates to a change in the es-
timated power flow between those locations. Alteration of
the voltage phase angle at a particular location by even
10◦ could cause an operator or automatic control logic to
take incorrect or unnecessary control action. A spurious
10◦ phase deviation can be imposed by the spoofer in a
matter of minutes.
Such a large variation in the phase angle difference may not
be seen as suspicious because wind power generation leaves
behind similar signatures. This can be seen clearly thanks
to a proof of concept network set up on the Texas power
grid [15]. Figure 13 shows the variation of wind power
generation in west Texas on March 10, 2009. There is a
large spike and a subsequent drop in wind power genera-
tion during the 11:00pm to midnight hour. The SMU data,
shown in Fig. 14, reveals a corresponding rise in the phase
angle difference between Austin and west Texas. A grid
operator looking at SMU measurements would not be able
to tell the difference between a spike in wind generation
and a spoofing attack without the benefit of direct mea-
surements of the wind power production. This suggests
that current power flow meters, if retained and monitored,
could provide a cross-check for SMU power flow estimates.
8
Fig. 13. Texas wind generation on March 10, 2009 [15]. Used with
permission from Mack Grady.
Fig. 14. SMU measured voltage phase angle difference between
Austin and west Texas during wind generation spike on March 10,
2009 [15]. Used with permission from Mack Grady.
B.2 Stability Determination
Another important application of SMUs is the determi-
nation of stability of the power grid. Unstable, low fre-
quency oscillations in the voltage phase angle can damage
power generators if no corrective action is taken. These
low-frequency oscillations occur due to changes in the load
or power generation on the power grid with the ampli-
tude of the oscillations scaling with the magnitude of the
load or power generation. Most often these oscillations are
damped by the power system stabilizers on the generators,
but larger disturbances can be difficult for these stabiliz-
ers to handle on their own and the damping could become
negative. The oscillations of concern are of magnitudes
greater than several tenths of a degree and frequencies be-
tween 0.1 Hz and 0.8 Hz [15].
Oscillations on the power grid are modeled as the super-
position of multiple second-order systems. The frequencies
and damping coefficients of these oscillations are estimated
using a modified version of the Prony Method [16], a close
cousin of the Fourier Transform that works on discrete
data points taken from a moving window. The data points
are modeled as a linear combination of damped sinusoids
and fit to a function of the form
Fig. 15. Example of SMU calculated damping ratios and frequencies
over an hour long period. The color of the dots indicate the magni-
tude of the oscillation with the largest 25% marked red, the second
25% marked blue, the third 25% marked green, and the lowest 25%
marked black. In this case, the red are several degrees in magnitude
and all others are less than a degree [15]. Used with permission from
Mack Grady.
f [mts + t0] =
n∑
i=1
1
2
Aie
(σi±j(λi(mts+t0)+φi)) (3)
where m is the sample number, ts is the sampling interval,
t0 is the start of the window, f [mts + t0] is the sample,
n is the number of damped sinusoids used for the fit, and
Ai, σi, λi, and φi are the amplitude, damping coefficient,
frequency, and phase angle of the ith damped sinusoid.
Figure 15 shows a plot of the observed damping ratios on
the Texas power grid calculated using this method over an
hour-long period. There is a large cluster of points, in-
dicating a persistent mode of the system, at 0.7 Hz and
a 2-Hz cluster that appears due to high wind power gen-
eration [15]. There are also a number of high amplitude
oscillations, indicated by red dots, that appear occasion-
ally during this time frame. These points have a large
damping ratio, likely due to the power system stabilizers,
and quickly die off.
Based on these tests, it seems impossible for a spoofer to
cause oscillations in the PMU measurements of sufficient
magnitude at an appropriate frequency to affect power grid
stability estimates. This is due to the low acceleration
capability of the spoofer. An oscillation at 0.1 Hz with an
amplitude of 0.1o would require a maximum acceleration
of about 550 m/s2 and a maximum velocity of about 900
m/s. These values are far beyond the admissible dynamics
indicated in Fig. 11.
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Fig. 16. Time of arrival determination using the leading edge of a
frequency fault as seen by multiple PMUs at different locations [5].
Used with permission from Qi Zeng.
B.3 Fault Localization
Another possible use of PMUs is fault localization. One
manifestation of a fault is a sudden drop or rise in fre-
quency. These effects propagate through the power grid at
the speed of light and will be observed by PMUs at differ-
ent locations at different times depending on the distance
from the source of the fault. Fig. 16 shows time of arrival
determination using the leading edge of the fault as it ar-
rives at different PMUs [5]. Using this information, Time
Difference Of Arrival (TDOA) techniques can be used to
locate the origin of the fault and remedial actions can be
taken.
GPS spoofers could potentially alter the time stamp of
the detected fault on one or more of the PMUs. This
would corrupt the estimate of the fault origin and hamper
repair efforts. Reference [5] investigates the results that
one might obtain if such an attack were carried out. In
one particular scenario from Ref. [5], the spoofer alters the
timing such that a fault that occurred in Indiana appears
to have occurred in Alabama.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Results of tests designed to characterize the response of a
civil GPS receiver to a spoofing attack indicate that a J/N-
type jamming detector is insufficient to catch a spoofer.
The ratio of spoofed signal power to authentic signal power
required to consistently capture a target receiver is only
about 1.1. This increase in J/N would typically be ig-
nored by a jamming detector because it is within the nat-
ural variation in J/N caused by GPS satellite constellation
changes and solar activity [7]. However, a J/N type jam-
ming detector is an essential component in many potential
spoofing defenses, including the Vestigial Signal Defense
(VSD), since it limits the amount of power a spoofer can
surreptitiously transmit, which prevents the spoofer from
completely suppressing the authentic signal by making it
appear as noise.
Investigations into the dynamics that a spoofer can induce
in a target receiver yielded results that varied drastically
between four tested receivers. An empirical curve fit for
the maximum acceleration that can be used by a spoofer to
reach a certain final velocity in position or timing without
raising alarms or causing loss of satellite lock in the target
receiver was produced for each receiver based on an ex-
ponential model. These curve fits define the upper bound
of a region of the velocity-acceleration plane in which the
spoofer can operate without triggering alarms or causing
loss of satellite lock in the target receiver. These empirical
formulas can be used to assess the vulnerability of critical
infrastructures utilizing these receivers.
The science receiver results showed that there is no limit
to the velocity a spoofer can induce in the receiver until
the Doppler frequency range of the receiver is exceeded at
around 1,300 m/s. However, the acceleration was severely
limited due to the science receiver’s constant indication of
phase trauma during accelerations above 2 m/s2, which
can be treated as an alarm in the absence of scintillation.
This type of visibility into the receiver’s tracking loops pro-
vides an advantage towards limiting a spoofer’s capability
of dynamically manipulating a receiver.
The telecommunications network time reference receiver
was by far the most difficult receiver to manipulate, with
a maximum attainable velocity for any acceleration being
only 2 m/s. This receiver’s inherent resistance to spoofer
imposed dynamics is due to the receiver placing trust in
its oscillator and only slowly steering it towards the GPS
time solution. However, the receiver can still be slowly
steered away from GPS time: a 10 µs departure can be
forced in around 35 minutes, including time for capturing
the receiver. This time offset is enough to prevent call
hand-off to or from a CDMA cell phone tower. A spoofer
– or spoofer network – could also cause multiple neighbor-
ing towers to interfere with one another, since CDMA cell
phone towers all use the same spreading code and distin-
guish themselves only by the phasing (i.e. time offset) of
their spreading codes. Furthermore, it appears possible for
a spoofer to impair CDMA-based E911 user-location.
The power grid time reference receiver was fairly easily
manipulated, with a maximum attainable velocity of 400
m/s, but it could only track single-digit accelerations. This
receiver is typically used as the time reference for Syn-
chrophasor Measurement Units (SMUs), which measure
voltage phasors on the power grid. SMUs are a proposed
smart grid technology that will provide real-time stabil-
ity analysis, power flow state estimation, and fault local-
ization. A spoofer could easily cause large variations in
the power flow estimates from SMU data by altering the
receiver’s time stamp, which in turn changes the voltage
phase angle suggesting a change in the power flow. The
maximum attainable phase angle rate from these tests was
10
1.73 o/min. These changes in power flow measurements
could cause a grid operator or automatic control logic to
take corrective actions based on falsified data, potentially
resulting in damage to the power grid. Current power flow
meters could provide a valuable cross-check against the
SMU derived power flow estimates. In order to affect grid
stability measures, a spoofer would be required to falsify
unstable, low-frequency oscillations in the phase measure-
ments. Based on the test results, it appears that a spoofer
is incapable of producing such oscillations at the appro-
priate frequencies with sufficient magnitudes. A spoofer
might also affect fault location estimates obtained through
time difference of arrival (TDOA) techniques using SMU
measurements. This could potentially cause large errors
in these location estimates which would hamper repair ef-
forts.
The name-brand receiver was by far the easiest receiver to
manipulate, with continuous acceleration possible up to 25
m/s2, and velocity is only limited by the Doppler frequency
range of the receiver. This suggests that the navigation
and timing solution of portable GPS receivers meant to
operate under a wide variety of platform dynamics could
be aggressively manipulated by a spoofer.
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